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State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAESs) were
established with federal formula funding by the Hatch Act
of 1887. In 1955, the Hatch Act was amended and a num-
ber of subsequent formula funding programs were consoli-
dated under the USDA Cooperative States Research Ser-
vice (CSRS), which today is known as the Cooperative
Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES).
Currently, all of the Hatch funds and a small amount of
other formula funds go to SAESs. In 1977, CSRS estab-
lished its first competitive research grant program. How-
ever, this program remained quite small until 1990, when
it was re-named the National Research Initiative (NRI)
Competitive Grants Program with a much larger funding
authorization. Currently, the SAESs account for 60% of
U.S. public agricultural research, with 7% of SAESs fund-
ing obtained from Hatch funds and 2.3% from NRI
Grant funds (Huffman & Evenson, 2006b, pp. 107, 117-
118). Hence, the SAES system has become relatively diver-
sified in its funding sources after starting with only Hatch
funding.
The characteristics of these funding sources are quite
different from a SAES perspective.
• Formula funds are allocated among the states by a leg-
islated formula, the choices of projects and scientists to
support are made locally, oversight is local, and fund-
ing is recurring. 
• Grant or NRI funds are allocated to proposals submit-
ted to programs with identified priority areas; only a
small share of submitted proposals are usually funded;
the process consumes many resources relative to grant
funds awarded, and there is no guarantee of success or
continuation of funding after the initial grant period. 
The composition of these funds has changed substantially
over time. From 1980 to 2003, the USDA-administered
federal formula funds declined by 57% or $124 million
(2,000 dollars; Huffman & Evenson, 2006a). Over this
time period, NRI appropriations increased by $120 mil-
lion, but less than 40% of NRI funds go to the SAESs.
The remainder goes to non-SAES units, especially those in
non-land grant universities. Hence, CSREES funding of
SAESs has fallen dramatically over the past 25 years. Other
changes in SAESs’ funding have also occurred since 1980.
They include an 88% increase in grants and contracts
from non-USDA federal agencies, a 51% increase in con-
tract, grant, and cooperative agreement funding from
USDA agencies other than CSREES, and a 100% increase
in Congressional earmarks or special grants for research.
Prospects are that the funding composition will con-
tinue to change. In the Fiscal 2007 Budget of the United
States, President George W. Bush proposed further reduc-
tions and eventually elimination of federal formula fund-
ing for agricultural research, while replacing these funds
with a new competitive grants program for State Agricul-
tural Experiment Stations with perhaps a regional focus.
The proposal seems likely to be rejected by Congress, but
new proposals to redirect federal formula funds seems
likely to resurface in the future. This raises questions of
who wins and who loses from such a policy change. 
This article examines who wins and loses from a
change in the composition of federal funding. We explore
the implications by examining
• Differences in who sets the research agenda, 
• Implications for priorities in long- and short-term
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• Capacity to respond to local
needs,
• Cost efficiency of distributing
funds,
• Distributional effects across the
states and regions, 
• Payoff to society, and 
• Sustainability of future funding.
Who sets the research agenda? 
A  major issue across alternative
research funding mechanisms is who
sets the research agenda. With federal
formula funds, the research agenda is
set by the states, either by the scien-
tists, the SAES directors, or a combi-
nation of the two. With a national
competitive grant program, the
research agenda is set by CSREES,
which uses input from the National
Agricultural Research, Extension,
Education, and Economics
(NAREEE) Advisory Board and
other advisory groups (Board on
Agriculture and Natural Resources,
2001, pp. 86-89). The current
CSREES grant agenda tends to take a
national perspective, but is also sub-
ject to political influence from vari-
ous lobbying groups, as well as fads
in research and public administra-
tion. Because crop and livestock pro-
duction is sensitive to local and
regional geo-climatic and economic
conditions, many important agricul-
tural research problems are local or
regional and not national in nature.
If formula funds are eliminated or
dramatically reduced, SAES direc-
tors in small heterogeneous states
might find it difficult to undertake
sufficient local agricultural research
to meet local needs. Research and
extension faculty would spend a
greater proportion of their state-
funded time writing proposals for
federal grants and conducting
research on grants based on Federal
priorities, with a smaller share of
their time addressing state-level
research needs. Some experiment sta-
tions would also risk losing matching
state funds, the amounts of which are
tied to the amount of federal formula
funds to be received. Hence, there is
more at stake than just federal for-
mula funds for agricultural research.
Therefore, the influence of national,
and perhaps regional, research inter-
ests would likely increase at the
expense of the influence of local
farmers, consumers, and agri-busi-
ness firms.
How would changes affect the 
willingness of scientists to undertake 
longer-term research objectives?
Federal formula and state funding
provide secure funding to scientists
across a broad set of disciplines
related to agriculture for undertaking
projects that require sustained multi-
year efforts before major objectives
and large payoffs can be obtained.
Examples of research that took
decades to complete, but that gener-
ated very high payoffs, include the
discovery of hybrid corn (Huffman
& Evenson, 2006b, pp. 159-161)
and of tillage systems that conserve
soil and provide outstanding crop
yields.      
Uncertainty about when and if
scientists will obtain competitive
grant funding, coupled with typically
shorter- run priorities in grant fund-
ing, reduces opportunities for long-
term pursuits and shifts research
efforts toward shorter-term projects
with more predictable outcomes
(Huffman & Just, 2000). A larger
federal competitive grants program
might have the advantage of leverag-
ing state and federal formula SAES
funding to focus on medium-term
national needs. This focus, however,
comes at the cost of reduced oppor-
tunities for long-term research. Also,
for some states a significant reduction
in formula funds might erode their
overall capacity to undertake agricul-
tural research. This would mean clos-
ing campus and outlying research
facilities and research farms. Under
the proposed changes in science pol-
icy, SAESs would lose flexibility to
purse long-term agricultural research
objectives, while agricultural research
with medium-term national or possi-
bly regional objectives would gain. 
Would changes affect the capacity of 
states to meet local and regional needs 
or to respond quickly to crises? 
Examples of research efforts generat-
ing high-payoffs for locally-impor-
tant crops include developing
• cultivation methods and new
varieties of wild rice in Minne-
sota, 
• blueberry cultivars with
improved taste and yield in
Maine, Michigan, and Vermont, 
• wastewater management research
in Maryland and North Carolina,
and 
• improved procedures for combat-
ing a new wheat rust in Kansas. 
These types of projects are disadvan-
taged when research funds are allo-
cated by national or regional compet-
itive grant programs, either because
these programs are cumbersome and
time-consuming to organize, or
because they cater to national or
regional, and not local, research
needs. Also, once scientists have been
awarded a large, multi-year competi-
tive grant to undertake a particular
line of research, their effort is
“locked-in,” and they are unable to
redirect their efforts to important,
new, and emerging local and regional
issues. Hence, local research interests
would lose and national research
interests would gain. 4th Quarter 2006 • 21(4) CHOICES 271
What is the relative cost of distributing 
the two types of funding? 
Compared to external competitive
grants programs, formula funding
has low administrative costs. Federal
formula funds are distributed to the
states by a fixed formula: part is allo-
cated equally to all states, part is allo-
cated to states according to their
share of the farm and rural popula-
tions, and part is allocated for multi-
state research (Huffman & Evenson,
2006b, pp. 23-25). Allocation of
these funds to individual research
projects and scientists is under the
control of the local SAES administra-
tion and is subject to local, but mini-
mal national political pressure. His-
torically, SAES Directors have built
ties to local clientele groups to help
prioritize state research needs and
have then integrated this information
with the research capacity of their
local scientists to allocate the total
research budget. SAES administra-
tors have generally required a small
amount of proposal writing and eval-
uating, preferring that their scientists
dedicate their efforts to conducting
research and publishing discoveries.
These administrators have a variety
of tools for setting incentives for sci-
entists, including repeat contracting
and annual evaluations for salary
increments. 
In contrast, competitive pro-
grams significantly increase the
amount of scientists’ time allocated
to proposal writing, assisting with
peer review of research proposals, and
peer-panel decisions on which pro-
posals to fund. In fact, a new layer of
CSREES bureaucracy has been added
to coordinate and administer the
NRI and other national competitive
grant programs.  Costs imposed on
scientists of competitive grant
research are not funded by the NRI
or by most other external competitive
grant programs. At the current NRI
research proposal funding rates of 5-
12%, large amounts of resources are
being consumed per dollar of
research grant funding reaching sci-
entists from this program (Huffman
& Just, 1999a). In addition, while
federal formula research funds do not
pay indirect costs to recipient institu-
tions, the NRI permits indirect costs
equal to 25% of project direct costs. 
Additionally, the Bush Adminis-
tration’s grant program proposal sug-
gests full funding of indirect costs,
which would raise the current indi-
rect cost rate on the NRI to an esti-
mated 45-55% of direct project costs
and use this higher indirect cost rate
on the new grant program for the
SAES.1 Although land grant univer-
sities vary in how they use the reve-
nue from indirect costs, it is common
for central administration to take
50% or more of these funds and for
the remainder to be split between the
college and department of the recipi-
ent principal investigators. It is
unusual for the principal investiga-
tor(s) of an externally funded project
to receive part of the revenue from
indirect costs. Indirect costs are pri-
marily an accounting concept and
not an economic concept, and a uni-
versity’s indirect cost rate for federal
grants is a negotiated rate between
the institution and the Office of
Management and Budget (May &
Sarson, 1999).Hence, the new Bush
policy would significantly increase
the amount of scientists’ efforts allo-
cated to proposal writing and evalu-
ating and the share of CSREES
research funds allocated to university
indirect costs.2 Central university
administrators would in general win,
but the SAES system would in gen-
eral be losers. If non-land grant uni-
versities were eligible for new
CSREES grant funds, then scientists
and administrators outside the SAES
system would be gainers at the
expense of the SAES system. In fact,
unless the pool of competitive grant
funds is increased dramatically, the
actual funds reaching SAES scien-
tists will decrease. 
Which states would be likely to gain or 
lose? 
Competitive grant funding tends to
favor institutions that have a large
research infrastructure supporting
research proposal writing and admin-
istration. In 1990, all but 11 SAES
units received more than 90% of
their CSRS-administered funds from
federal formula funds and just 10%
from competitive grants. Experi-
ment Stations with larger shares from
competitive grants included Massa-
chusetts, New York, Florida, Michi-
gan, Wisconsin, Arizona, California,
and Oregon. In 2004 these same
states, plus Maryland, Rhode Island,
Kansas, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and
Texas, were the leaders. The states
that remain heavily dependent on
formula funds are the ones likely to
be the most disadvantaged by a shift
toward increased funding through
competitive grant programs. They
are New Hampshire, New Jersey, W.
Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana, Minne-
1. Indirect cost revenue goes to pay for 
university administration, research 
facilities (infrastructure), and utili-
ties to laboratories, which are not 
easily attributable to individual 
projects, and hence not permitted 
under project direct costs.  
2. It is a data-intensive and time-con-
suming process for universities to 
document and defend their request 
for an indirect cost rate to the Office 
of Management and Budget (May 
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sota, Mississippi, Tennessee, South
Dakota, Alaska, and Hawaii. The
other 24 states would be small losers.
See figure 1. In general, states where
the SAES is part of a mid- to large-
size land grant university outside of
the South-Southeast would be win-
ners and others would be losers,
including states with a small agricul-
tural sector. If the new grant program
were regional in nature, this would
provide a more equitable distribution
of the research funds across regions,
but it would sacrifice much of the
potential gains from high scholar-
ship.
Would society gain or lose? 
Under the Hatch Act, federal for-
mula funds are allocated for research
across problems in agriculture, mar-
keting, forestry, home economics,
and rural and community develop-
ment, which are researched from the
perspective of several disciplines.
Washington administrators some-
times suggest that this is too broad—
topics or disciplines— or not ade-
quately targeted on important
national issues, reducing its overall
impact. In addition, a claim is some-
times made that this research is not
subject to rigorous research meth-
ods, and that projects are reviewed
infrequently. But scientists working
on these projects must publish in
scholarly outlets in order to prosper
professionally. Thus, the expectations
set by their colleagues and university
administrators are a critical factor
affecting scientists’ efforts in research
and other activities. As evidence that
public agricultural research is pro-
ductive, Huffman and Evenson
(2006a) found that the social rate of
return to public agricultural research
remains high—about a 50% real rate
of return. However, they also found
that shifting federal formula to com-
petitive grant programs would lower
its impact and rate of return. In a
related study, Huffman and Evenson
(2006b, pp. 276-278) found that
from this type of fund reallocation
only California, Oregon, and Wis-
consin would likely benefit from
increased research productivity, while
the other 45 contiguous states would
likely see a decline in productivity.
Hence, a case can be made for
increasing federal formula funding.
The production process for scien-
tific discoveries contains uncertainty.
Scientific efforts result in a contin-
uum of output from no discovery to
a revolutionary discovery. Further-
more, unanticipated discoveries
sometimes occur. Hence, the social
payoff or value of any research
project is initially unknown. The
uncertainty to stakeholders in scien-
tific discovery can be reduced by
research administrators choosing to
undertake a portfolio of diverse
projects with diverse incentives for
Figure 1. States likely to gain or lose from a CSREES increase of competitive grant funding and decrease in formula fund-
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discovery (Huffman & Just, 2000).
This implies that more than expected
returns are at issue. With a variety of
research funding mechanisms, such
as federal formula and competitive
funding, it is possible for some scien-
tists to be working with strong incen-
tives for discovery and others with
weaker incentives. Simultaneously,
some can work on long-term goals
and yet others on short-term or inter-
mediate goals. Hence, a case can be
made for larger competitive grant
funding for selective national or per-
haps regional priorities. Moreover, a
diversified portfolio of projects and
funding mechanisms decreases soci-
ety’s discovery risk.3 
How would changes affect the 
sustainability of research funding? 
If fewer dollars were allocated across
the land grant system for formula
funding, for example by eliminating
formula funds to small SAESs, those
dollars could be used to increase the
research funds available for competi-
tive grant programs. In this scenario,
the country might not “need” more
than 20 Colleges of Agriculture and
SAESs, and perhaps could get by
with even fewer. However, dramati-
cally reducing the number of states
receiving federal agricultural research
funds would greatly change the polit-
ical economy of federal agricultural
research funding. One prospect is
that, over time, the currently strong
Congressional support for formula
funds would wither under a competi-
tive grant program, and total
CSREES appropriations for competi-
tively funded agricultural research
would decline. State matching funds
would also decline. Another possibil-
ity is that the excluded land grant
universities would pursue Congres-
sionally earmarked research funds or
“special grants” on a grander scale
(National Research Council, 2003,
pp. 71-72; Huffman & Evenson,
2006b, pp. 116-117; Law & Tonon,
2006). Hence, a few states would win
in the short run, but all might lose in
the long run. There are also strong
implications for complementary uni-
versity instruction and public out-
reach (extension) programs of alter-
ing the nature of the complementary
research support from formula funds.
Conclusions
Some will win and some will lose
with changes in the size and relative
amount of CSREES-administered
formula and competitive grant fund-
ing for agricultural research. We con-
clude that a further reduction or
elimination of federal formula fund-
ing of agricultural research will sig-
nificantly impact 
• Future research priorities and the
research agenda,
• The composition of short- versus
long-term research,
• The mix of national versus local
needs research,
• The transactions costs of under-
taking research,
• The distribution of research
funds across the states,
• The distribution of research ben-
efits across states, 
• T h e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  t h a t  s o c i e t y
earns from its research invest-
ments, 
• The discovery risk faced by soci-
ety, and 
• The sustainability of future
research funding.
Although recent research has shown
that the social rate of return to public
agricultural research would decline as
the competitive grant share rises, we
believe that the very considerable
risks associated with future discover-
ies in agricultural research will be
best diversified by maintaining a
portfolio of CSREES administered
formula and competitive grants
funding in the future. Moreover, a
case can be made for continuing and
possibly increasing federal formula
funding because of their high payoff
and at the same time expanding com-
petitive grant funding to address
selective high priority national or
perhaps regional needs. 
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